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-AT ISSUE
A Right to Talk
Has Justice Antonin Scalia compromised his objectivity with a public remark?
With two assisted suicide cases scheduled for
argument before the Supreme Court this term,
Justice Antonin Scalia already has publicly staked out
his position on the issue.
While sentiments he expressed in 1990 in
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health,
497 U.S. 261, are well-known, Scalia told an
audience at Catholic University late last year that
it is "absolutely plain there is no [constitutionall
right to die."
Is it proper for sitting judges to make such
statements? While no one would deny Scalia his First
Amendment right to say what he pleases, that hardly
quells concerns about the advisability of making
such statements.
Vincent Martin Bonventre, a professor at
Albany Law School in New York state, contends that
Scalia crossed a line, robbing the public of its
confidence in justices' open-mindedness and
willingness to consider each case on its own merits.
For Lloyd B. Snyder, a professor at Cleveland-
Marshall Law School, not only is Scalia well within
the boundaries of propriety, but he has done lawyers
and potential litigants a favor by speaking so openly.
Yes: Litigants deserve a justice with an open mind
At best, Justice Scalia's remarks were
imprudent. To be sure, few Court watchers
were surprised to learn that Scalia finds
the idea of a constitutionally based right to
die unpersuasive. His previous expressions
on the subject, on and off the bench, as well
as his views about judicially cognizable
liberties, have left little doubt about his
beliefs on such questions. I
But Scalia's unqualified declarations B
"It's absolutely plain there is no right to die"
and "It doesn't belong in the Supreme Court i
as a constitutional question"-evince a
closed mind, an unconditional rejection and,
indeed, a hostility about a specific issue S
being argued in pending appeals. As a sit-
ting member of the Court, Scalia will be
participating in the disposition of those
appeals. As a judicial official, he has the
responsibility to consider the issue as a
neutral, unbiased magistrate. It is difficult
to imagine how Scalia can function as such.
In many ways, Scalia is refreshing. He
is outspoken and candid. He is a public of-
ficial who shares his views with the public.
Anyone can learn his position on textualism, orig-
inal intent, federalism, judicial usurpation and inap-
propriate resolution of complex social problems in the
courts, to name a few. Whether he intends it or not,
Scalia is a walking, talking rebuttal of the nonsensical
notion of judges as detached intellects with no precon-
ceptions, predispositions, personal convictions or philo-
sophical outlooks that affect their decision-making.
But Scalia has gone beyond the bounds of candor.
His categorical repudiation of a right to die crossed the
line into the injudicious. It is not that judges should keep
their opinions to themselves; they should keep their
minds open. It is not that judges should feign neutrality;
they should actually remain undecided. It is
not that judges should give litigants a false
sense of confidence; they should truly listen
to and consider the arguments. A judge-
like anyone-may be predisposed; but his or
her decision ought not to be preordained.
The ABA Model Code of Judicial Con-
duct (1990) treats comments and behavior
that raise questions about neutrality as un-
ethical. Canon 3(B)(9) warns against "any
public comment" by a judge that might "im-
pair [the] fairness" of any pending or im-
pending proceeding. Canon 4(A)(1) similarly
admonishes judicial officers to avoid all "ex-
tra-judicial activities" that might "cast rea-
sonable doubt on the judge's capacity to act
impartially." And Canon 3(E)(1) prescribes
disqualification of a judge whenever "impar-
tiality might reasonably be questioned."
An argument could certainly be made
t that Scalia's remarks fall within the pur-
view of those provisions. Surely, the parties
urging the Court to give constitutional effect
to their choice to die have every reason to
believe that Scalia's mind is already fixed
against their claims. They have every reason to believe
that they begin with only eight, not nine, possible votes.
Scalia's remarks have variously been labeled in-
discreet, injudicious, very poor form and an embarrass-
ment to the Court. Legal commentators have largely
refrained-openly, that is-to call them unethical. Suf-
fice it to say that his remarks would seem to contra-
vene the spirit of the judicial code to maintain impar-
tiality and fairness, as well as the appearance thereof.
In that sense, his outright dismissal of any right to
die was at least unfortunate and unwise. As he himself
might well acknowledge, the advocacy of personal opin-
ion does not mix easily with the role of neutral arbiter.
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No: Lawyers always want to know what a judge is thinking
In 1990 Justice Scalia wrote in the
Cruzan case that there is no right to die.
In 1996 he said the same thing in a speech
at Catholic University. The first state-
ment has raised nary an eyebrow. The re-
marks at Catholic University, however,
have engendered much editorial comment
suggesting that it was not proper for
Scalia to say in public what he had previ-
ously written for publication.
The fact that two right-to-die cases
are pending before the Supreme Court has
energized the criticism about his remarks.
I am at a loss to understand this misguid-
ed criticism.
Scalia's critics have not suggested
that he has done anything illegal. The
First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution
would defeat any such argument. That
amendment prohibits governmental laws
or regulations that abridge freedom of
speech.
Scalia has the same constitutional O
right to state his thoughts about the great
issues of the day as you and I have. The
Constitution of the United States does not contain an
escape clause authorizing restrictions on the rights of
attorneys, judges or Supreme Court justices.
The criticism of the justice is more subtle. Critics
say that Scalia has exercised bad form; he has been
indiscreet. What is the great evil behind this indis-
cretion?
It is that the parties involved in the cases now be-
fore the Court will lose faith in our justice system if
they learn the justice's views prior to his decision in
their case. The public at large will also, we are told,
lose confidence in the impartiality ofjudges. Nonsense.
Competent lawyers always research the views of
the judges before whom they appear, and
they use this information in advising their
clients. The lawyers asserting a right to die
in the cases currently before the Supreme
Court have read the Cruzan case. They
know where Justice Scalia stands. And
they have, most likely, advised their clients
accordingly.
Both the lawyers and the clients knew
after the Catholic University speech just
what they knew before the speech: Justice
Scalia is a lost cause on this issue. To win,
the attorneys will have to pitch their argu-
ments to the other justices.
In fact, I would bet that the lawyers
would prefer to have had some of the other
justices those who have not expressed
views in prior cases-speak about the right-
to-die issue. Nothing is more frustrating for
an attorney than appearing before a judge
without having a handle on the questions
that most concern the judge.
or Nor is the public at large likely to gain
or lose respect for our legal system based on
the contents of Scalia's remarks. To the ex-
tent that they care about the issue at all, they are more
likely to be concerned about whether Scalia is right
than whether he has expressed his views in a concur-
ring opinion or a speech.
I seriously doubt that the propriety of the forum
for judicial comment is at the forefront of public con-
cern about our legal system.
So if the public at large does not care, and if at-
torneys and clients want to know as much as they can
about the views of judges they appear before, who is
harmed by public statements of judges about impor-
tant issues?
My point exactly. Let the man talk. U
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